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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   
    n early 2008, the head of Hezbollah’s international operations, Imad 
Mughniyah, walked through the parking lot of a restaurant in a leafy Da-
mascus suburb. As he approached a parked SUV, a team of Mossad agents 
                                                                                                                      
 Professor of Criminal Law, SOAS, University of London. 
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remotely detonated a bomb that they had placed in the SUV’s spare tire. 
Mughniyah was killed instantly.1 
Six years later, the Washington Post published an article on the CIA’s in-
volvement in Mughniyah’s death.2 In that article, Mary Ellen O’Connell 
claimed that the Mossad agents had committed perfidy by killing him 
through the use of a bomb hidden inside a civilian vehicle. “It is a killing 
method used by terrorists and gangsters,” she argued. “It violates one of 
the oldest battlefield rules.”3 
Is O’Connell correct? Article 37(1) of the Additional Protocol I (AP I)4 
prohibits killing, injuring or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy, but 
is it perfidious to kill an adversary by disguising a military object as a civil-
ian object? Or is such disguise simply an effective ruse of war, which Arti-
cle 37(2) specifically permits? 
This essay argues that making a military object appear to be a civilian 
object—such as disguising a bomb as an SUV’s spare tire—is a permissible 
ruse of war, not a prohibited act of perfidy, as long as the civilian object in 
question does not receive special protection under international humanitar-
ian law (IHL). It nevertheless concludes that Mughniyah’s killing was, in 
fact, perfidious, because outside of an active combat zone a remotely-
detonated explosive device disguised as a civilian object must be located in 
the close vicinity of a military objective, which the SUV was not. 
 
II. CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
 
Conventional IHL provides little textual guidance concerning whether it is 
perfidious to kill5 by disguising a military object as a civilian object. Two 
international conventions address perfidy: the Hague Regulations of 1907 
and AP I. Article 23 of the Hague Regulations provides that “it is especially 
                                                                                                                      
1. Adam Goldman & Ellen Nakashima, CIA and Mossad Killed Senior Hezbollah Figure in 
Car Bombing, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/cia-and-mossad-killed-senior-hezbollah-figure-in-car-bombing/20 
15/01/30/ebb88682-968a-11e4-8005-1924ede3e54a_story.html. 
2. The CIA had helped build the bomb and a CIA team monitored Mughniyah’s 
movements in the minutes leading up to his death. 
3. Goldman & Nakashima, supra note 1. 
4. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I].  
5. Injuring and capturing by use of perfidy are also prohibited by Article 37(1) of AP 
I. For sake of clarity, though, this essay will refer solely to killing.  
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forbidden” to “kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the 
hostile nation or army,”6 while Article 37(1) of AP I defines perfidy as kill-
ing, injuring, or capturing an adversary by resort to act “inviting the confi-
dence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is 
obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable 
in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence.” Neither conven-
tion includes a definitive list of perfidious acts, although Article 37 pro-
vides a number of examples of perfidy, such as—most relevantly for pur-
poses of this essay—“the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status.”7 
It is generally accepted that the modern definition of perfidy encom-
passes three essential elements: (1) an act inviting an adversary to believe 
that IHL either entitles him to protection from attack or prohibits him 
from engaging in a particular attack; (2) the adversary’s acceptance of that 
invitation by exposing himself to attack or by not attacking; and (3) inten-
tionally betraying the adversary’s confidence with harmful consequences.8 
According to Rogier Bartels, all three elements are satisfied when an adver-
sary is killed by a military object disguised as a civilian object. Here is what 
he says regarding Mughniyah’s killing: 
 
The bomb was not just placed on the street or in a parking lot. It was 
“disguised” as a civilian object (because that is what effectively is done, 
when a bomb is planted in or mounted on a civilian car). The car thereby 
became a military object, but (purposely) no measures were taken to dis-
tinguish it as being military. Using a civilian vehicle “invites the belief” 
that this was indeed a civilian SUV. Seeing a regular civilian car, a com-
batant should be able to trust (be confident) that he is not going to be at-
tacked from that car (or that it is not “going to attack” him by way of a 
shaped or targeted detonation). And, of course, a civilian vehicle was used 
on purpose, rather than a green vehicle with IDF or US army symbols on 
                                                                                                                      
6. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(b), annexed 
to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
7. AP I, supra note 4, art. 37(1)(c). 
8. Sean Watts, Law-of-War Perfidy, 219 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 106, 107–8 (2014). See 
also COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1500 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno 
Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter AP I COMMENTARY]. 
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it, as surely [Mughniyah] would not obliviously have walked up such an 
army vehicle belonging to the enemy.9 
 
This is a serious argument, especially given that Article 37(1) specifical-
ly deems “feigning civilian, non-combatant status” a form of perfidy. It is 
also one with which other scholars agree.10 Conventional IHL, however, 
does not unequivocally support the idea that it is always perfidious to kill by 
disguising a military object as a civilian object. In particular, such a categor-
ical rule is impossible to reconcile with conventional IHL’s distinction be-
tween perfidy and ruses,11 because Article 37(2) of API specifically deems 
camouflage, a common method for disguising a military object as a civilian 
object, a permissible ruse of war:  
 
Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to in-
duce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law 
applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do 
not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under 
that law. The following are examples of such ruses: the use of camou-
flage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation. 
 
The point of camouflage is to make a military object, such as an artillery 
piece or a tank, appear to be a civilian object, whether natural, such as foli-
age, or artificial, such as a building. Effective camouflage lulls enemy sol-
diers into a false sense of security from attack, because it makes them be-
lieve—wrongly—that they are surrounded solely by civilian objects even 
when they are within the military object’s field of fire. An attack with a 
camouflaged weapon is thus far more likely to be successful than an attack 
with an uncamouflaged one. 
                                                                                                                      
9. Rogier Bartels, Killing with Military Equipment Disguised as Civilian Objects is Perfidy, 
JUST SECURITY (Mar. 20, 2015), http://justsecurity.org/21285/disguising-military-
weapons-civilian-equipment-perfidy-or-be/. 
10. See, e.g., Robert Clarke, The Club-K Anti-Ship Missile System: A Case Study in Perfidy 
and its Repression, 20 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 22, 23 (2012) (arguing that it would be perfidy 
for a unmarked merchant vessel to launch an attack with concealed weaponry, because in 
such a situation “the vessel could maintain both a powerful armament and the pretense 
that it is legally protected, thus inviting the confidence of an adversary” that it was im-
mune from attack). 
11. See, e.g., Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 24 (“Ruses of war and the employ-
ment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country 
are considered permissible.”); AP I, supra note 4, art. 37(2) (“Ruses of war are not prohib-
ited.”). 
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III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
 
Conventional IHL, then, indicates that at least one form of disguising a 
military object as a civilian object—camouflage—is a permissible ruse of 
war, not a prohibited act of perfidy. As this section demonstrates, custom-
ary IHL is even more tolerant of such deceptive practices. Not only have 
States consistently used and affirmed the legality of camouflage, they have 
also consistently used and affirmed the legality of four other military prac-
tices that rely on the same kind of disguise: ambush, cover, booby-traps 
and landmines. Subject to the limitations discussed in the next section, 
therefore, all five practices must be considered non-perfidious ruses of 
war,12 even if—as this section also argues—that conclusion is theoretically 
unsatisfying. 
 
A. Camouflage 
 
It is not surprising that Article 37(2) deems camouflage a permissible ruse 
of war, given that States have routinely camouflaged their soldiers and mili-
tary objects since World War II.13 At sea, both Allied and Axis navies went 
to great lengths to “help ships blend with the surrounding environment,” 
such as through “dazzle painting, the use of flat colors, or extending cam-
ouflage netting when moored.”14 Similarly, on land, Allied and Axis armies 
“went to extraordinary length to give aircraft factories and other military 
industrial complexes the appearance of civilian neighborhoods.”15 Watts 
cites the United States as an example of those efforts: 
 
The United States fabricated complete towns, including houses, streets, 
and trees, atop the roofs of the Boeing Corporation’s Seattle military air-
craft assembly plants. Other U.S. industrial camouflage schemes included 
the addition of false church spires to critical factories. In fact, U.S. indus-
trial camouflage practice was advanced enough to inspire a manual on the 
topic jointly published by the Department of Agriculture and the Pratt 
                                                                                                                      
12. Cf. Watts, supra note 8, at 161 (noting that “the range of permissible ruses is in 
some sense tied to historic military practice and custom”). 
13. GUY HARTCUP, CAMOUFLAGE: A HISTORY OF CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION 
IN WAR 12 (1980). 
14. Matthew G. Morris, “Hiding Amongst a Crowd” and the Illegality of Deceptive Lighting, 
54 NAVAL LAW REVIEW 235, 251 (2007). 
15. Watts, supra note 8, at 163. 
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Institute Art School. The manual recommends camouflaging roofs of fac-
tories to resemble small homes and back yards.16 
 
The Allies also used camouflage for offensive purposes. The Australian Air 
Force, for example, disguised its entire base at Bankstown, New South 
Wales, as a small country town “for attack as well as defence, and for ag-
gressive surprise. These roughly made large-scale buildings mimicking the 
vernacular architecture of Sydney concealed bomber and fighter planes 
ready to take to the air at short notice.”17  
States have also consistently affirmed the legality of camouflaging mili-
tary objects and soldiers. The most obvious example, of course, is Article 
37(2) itself; AP I has been ratified by 174 States. That approval is reflected 
in numerous State military manuals, including those issued by Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, 
Italy, Kenya, Madagascar, Netherlands, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, Swe-
den, the UK and the United States.18 
It is difficult to understand why the lethal use of camouflage does not 
qualify as perfidy. Using a camouflaged military object to kill seems to satis-
fy all three of perfidy’s essential elements. By making the military object 
appear to be a civilian object, camouflage seems to invite the adversary to 
believe that the object will not attack him and that he cannot attack it—
element one. The enemy soldier thus exposes himself to attack by ap-
proaching the military object and not firing on it—element two. The at-
tacker then deliberately takes advantage of the enemy soldier’s exposure 
and kills him—element three. 
Using camouflage to disguise a military object as a civilian object clearly 
satisfies the second and third elements of perfidy—what Watts helpfully 
calls, analogizing to contract law, the “acceptance” and “breach” require-
ments.19 The permissibility of camouflage must mean, therefore, that dis-
guising a military object as a civilian object does not satisfy the first element 
of perfidy—“offer”20—because it does not “invit[e] the confidence of an 
adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to ac-
                                                                                                                      
16. Id. at 163–64. 
17. ANN ELIAS, CAMOUFLAGE AUSTRALIA: ART, NATURE, SCIENCE AND WAR 37 
(2011). 
18. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1246–55 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY STUDY II]. 
19. Watts, supra note 8, at 147. 
20. Id. 
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cord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict.”  
But why not? After all, the principle of distinction in Article 48 of AP I 
does not distinguish between civilians and civilian objects,21 and Article 
37(1)(c) generally prohibits as perfidious “the feigning of civilian, non-
combatant status.” There is no question that a soldier commits an act of 
perfidy if he disguises himself as a member of the civilian population—by 
wearing civilian clothes, for example—and kills an adversary, because that 
soldier has deliberately taken advantage of his claim to protection against 
attack under Article 48. So why doesn’t an attacker commit perfidy if he 
uses a tank disguised to look like part of a civilian apartment building to kill 
an adversary? Hasn’t the attacker deliberately taken advantage of the fact 
that, having been tricked into seeing only a civilian object, the enemy sol-
dier is led to believe that IHL prohibits him from attacking the apartment 
building and prohibits the attacker from using the apartment building to 
attack him? 
The answer appears to be that States simply refuse to equate feigning 
civilian status with feigning civilian-object status. In other words, States 
evidently believe that, in terms of a claim to protection under IHL, there is 
a difference between using camouflage to make a soldier appear to be a 
civilian22 and using camouflage to make a tank appear to be a civilian 
apartment building: only the former invites the adversary to believe that 
“he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection” under IHL to the ci-
vilian thing in question. 
This interpretation is supported by perfidy scholarship. Almost without 
exception, IHL scholars draw a categorical distinction between using cam-
ouflage to feign civilian status and using it to feign civilian-object status. 
A.P.V. Rogers, for example, specifically distinguishes 
 
the camouflaging of a tank so that the enemy pass by unaware of its ex-
istence and are then fired on at short and lethal range (a ruse) and (b) the 
                                                                                                                      
21. Article 48 reads, in full: “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civil-
ian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.” 
22. In this context, “camouflage” refers to any attempt to make something military 
appear to be civilian. A soldier who dresses as a civilian is thus no less “camouflaged” than 
the tank painted to resemble a group of bushes. 
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soldier who feigns wounds so that he can fire at short and lethal range on 
an enemy soldier who comes to his assistance (perfidy).23  
 
According to Rogers, “[i]n the first case the tank crew do not feign pro-
tected status at all; in the second, the soldier lures the adversary into danger 
by pretending to have the protected status of someone hors de combat.”24 
Solis takes a similar position, claiming that 
 
[t]he wearing of the ubiquitous camouflage field uniform is not perfidy. 
Although the camouflaged soldier hopes to kill, wound, or capture the 
enemy, his wearing of camouflage does not involve any assurance of pro-
tection under LOAC. A soldier may attempt to become invisible in the 
landscape, but not in a crowd.25  
 
Even the ICRC Commentary on AP I distinguishes between simulating civil-
ian status and simulating civilian-object status. As it notes with regard to 
Article 37, 
 
[a] combatant who takes part in an attack, or in a military operation pre-
paratory to an attack, can use camouflage and make himself virtually in-
visible against a natural or man-made background, but he may not feign a 
civilian status and hide amongst a crowd. This is the crux of the rule 
[against perfidy].26 
 
Because States are the authors of both conventional and customary in-
ternational law, they are entitled to adopt a definition of perfidy that is 
based on the civilian/civilian-object distinction. It is important to note, 
though, that the distinction is theoretically unsatisfying. As the wording of 
Article 37 indicates, the sight of a civilian thing27 invites two different be-
liefs in an enemy soldier: the belief that he cannot attack the civilian thing 
(an obligation to accord protection) and the belief that the civilian thing 
will not attack him (an entitlement to protection). Insisting on the civil-
ian/civilian-object distinction makes sense in terms of the second belief—
entitlement to protection against attack—because conventional IHL does 
not obligate attackers to distinguish themselves (their combatants and mili-
                                                                                                                      
23. A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 37 (2d ed. 2004). 
24. Id. 
25. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 423 (2010). 
26. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 8, ¶ 1507. 
27. I am using “thing” generically to refer to both civilian objects and civilians. 
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tary hardware) from civilian objects; pursuant to Article 44(3) of AP I, they 
must only “distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are 
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.” 
But what about the second belief—the obligation to accord protection 
from attack? The civilian/civilian object distinction is irrelevant to that be-
lief, because Article 48 prohibits combatants from directly attacking both 
civilian objects and civilian persons. In other words, it does not matter 
whether the use of camouflage leads an enemy soldier to believe that he is 
seeing a civilian object or a civilian person; in each case, the rules of IHL 
obligate him not to deliberately attack that civilian thing. So it seems that 
deliberately inviting that belief in order to kill the enemy soldier should be 
perfidious regardless of whether the camouflage involves a military object or 
a combatant.  
 
B. Ambush 
 
Ambush is another common military practice that involves disguising a 
military object as a civilian object. When a group of soldiers uses a civilian 
object to enable them to launch a surprise attack—hiding inside of a 
burned-out school bus or behind a hedgerow next to a road—that civilian 
object becomes a military object through its use.28 The success of the am-
bush nevertheless depends upon enemy soldiers continuing to believe that 
the now-military-object is still a civilian one: the adversary will not be sur-
prised by the attack if they suspect that the school bus contains soldiers or 
that there are soldiers crouching behind the hedgerow.29  
There is little question that an ambush is a permissible ruse of war, not 
a prohibited act of perfidy. Ambush is a “long-established military tactic” 
that has been used “consistently throughout history, from ancient to mod-
                                                                                                                      
28. See AP I, supra note 4, art. 52(2) (noting that military objects are “those objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military 
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstanc-
es ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”). 
29. There is obviously a deep affinity between ambush and camouflage. Indeed, it is 
possible to describe using a camouflaged military object to attack the adversary as a kind 
of ambush. See, e.g., Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS § 471 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995) (noting that 
“[c]amouflaging one’s own defence positions and using them for ambushes” or “setting 
up surprise attacks from such camouflaged positions” is not perfidy). States and scholars, 
however, normally treat camouflage and ambush as separate military practices. 
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ern warfare.”30 Indeed, the Trojan horse—the “classical example of ruse,” 
according to Fleck31—is best described as an ambush. States have also con-
sistently affirmed the legality of using ambush during armed conflict. The 
U.S. Law of War Manual, for example, states categorically that “[t]he law of 
war does not prohibit the use of surprise to conduct attacks, such as the 
use of surprise in ambushes,” because there is “no requirement that an en-
emy combatant must be warned before being attacked. Rather, warning 
requirements only apply with respect to the civilian population.”32 Numer-
ous other military manuals specifically deem an ambush a permissible ruse 
of war, including those issued by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ecuador, Is-
rael, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland 
and the UK.33 As with the use of camouflage, States justify the legality of 
ambush by insisting—unpersuasively, for the reasons discussed above—
that placing soldiers in or behind civilian objects in order to surprise the 
adversary “is not treacherous because it does not inspire the confidence of 
the adversary with respect to protection under the humanitarian law of 
war.”34 
Rogier Bartels has argued that the legality of ambush does not, in fact, 
contradict the idea that it is perfidious to disguise a military object as a ci-
vilian object. In his view, it is critical to distinguish between ambushes in 
urban areas and ambushes that are “laid somewhere in the field, making 
use of the natural surroundings to hide behind,”35 because urban ambushes 
are perfidious while “classic” ambushes in the field are ruses of war. Israel 
draws a similar natural/artificial distinction with regard to whether the use 
of camouflage is perfidious, taking the position that “camouflaging a com-
batant to appear like objects in the natural surroundings . . . is permitted 
(such as painting the face black, adding leaves to helmet, and so forth), 
                                                                                                                      
30. MICHIKO PHIFER, A HANDBOOK OF MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS 146 
(2012). 
31. Dieter Fleck, Ruses of War and Prohibition of Perfidy, 13 MILITARY LAW & THE LAW 
OF WAR REVIEW 269, 273 (1974).  
32. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL 200 (2015). 
33. CUSTOMARY STUDY II, supra note 18, at 1246–55. 
34. Id. at 1250 (citing the Military Manual of the Netherlands). 
35. See Kevin Jon Heller, No, Disguising Military Equipment as Civilian Objects to Help Kill 
Isn’t Perfidy, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 24, 2015), http://justsecurity.org/21391/no-disguising-
military-equipment-civilian-objects-kill- perfidy/. 
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while camouflaging a combatant to appear like objects in the human sur-
roundings” is not.36 
Neither position is tenable. Both Bartels and Israel seem to assume that 
there is a salient legal difference between making a military object look like 
an artificial object, such as an apartment building or burned-out school bus, 
and making a military object look like a natural object, such as a group of 
bushes or a hedgerow. That distinction, however, finds no support in IHL, 
which clearly deems the natural environment no less a civilian object than 
man-made things. As the ICRC notes: 
 
State practice considers civilian areas, towns, cities, villages, residential ar-
eas, dwellings, buildings and houses and schools, civilian means of trans-
portation, hospitals, medical establishments and medical units, historic 
monuments, places of worship and cultural property, and the natural en-
vironment as prima facie civilian objects, provided, in the final analysis, 
they have not become military objectives.37 
 
That conclusion is amply supported by State practice and opinio juris. 
Article 2(4) of Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCCW), to which 112 States are party, provides that “[i]t is pro-
hibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by 
incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, 
conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are 
themselves military objectives.” Similarly, Australia’s law of armed conflict 
manual states categorically that “[t]he natural environment is not a legiti-
mate object of attack. Destruction of the environment, not justified by mil-
itary necessity, is punishable as a violation of international law.”38 Other 
military manuals include similar statements, including those issued by Bel-
gium and Italy, and a number of States treat the environment as a civilian 
object in their domestic war crimes legislation, including Burundi, Canada, 
                                                                                                                      
36. CUSTOMARY STUDY II, supra note 18, at 1249 (citing the Israeli Manual on the 
Laws of War). Cf. Watts, supra note 8, at 166–67 (stating that “the least objectionable uses 
of camouflage involve matching an object or person’s appearance with a natural environ-
ment”). 
37. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 34 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts 
& Louise Doswald- Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY STUDY I].  
38. COMMANDANT, AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE WARFARE CENTER, AFDP 37, 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 5-7 (1996) [hereinafter AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE MAN-
UAL]. 
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Congo, Georgia, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Spain and the UK.39 
Because the natural environment is no less a civilian object than the ar-
tificial environment, it cannot be argued that urban ambushes are acts of 
perfidy while ambushes in the field are permissible ruses of war. It is simply 
inconsistent with IHL’s principle of distinction to argue that launching an 
ambush from inside a burned-out school bus invites the adversary to be-
lieve “that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection” under IHL, 
but launching an ambush from behind a hedgerow does not. Either both 
ambushes invite that confidence or neither does. And even Bartels 
acknowledges—rightly, given the above analysis—that “classic” ambushes 
in the field are legitimate.  
In the context of ambush, then, the perfidy/ruse distinction turns not 
on whether the military object is disguised as a natural or artificial object, 
but on whether the attacker is simulating civilian status or civilian-object 
status. As with camouflage, the latter is a permissible ruse of war, while the 
former is a prohibited act of perfidy: 
 
While combatants take up a defensive position they must carry arms 
openly when intending to open fire. This does not exclude the possibility 
of an ambush, but an ambush is subject to the same conditions as those 
which apply to uniformed troops. It is the natural or artificial environ-
ment which should camouflage the combatant engaged in the ambush, 
and not his civilian clothing, and he should carry his arms in the same 
way as a soldier of the regular army would in the same situation.40  
 
In other words, although soldiers can ambush the adversary by hiding in-
side a burned-out school bus or behind a hedgerow, they cannot ambush 
the adversary by dressing as civilians and hiding within a civilian popula-
tion. 
 
C. Cover 
 
Cover is any “natural or manmade feature that protects an individual, vehi-
cle, or unit from enemy observation, direct or indirect fire, and/or air at-
                                                                                                                      
39. CUSTOMARY STUDY II, supra note 18, at 846–48. 
40. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 8, ¶ 1708. 
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tack.”41 Similar to ambush, taking cover provides a significant advantage42 
to an attacking43 soldier by disguising the fact that a civilian object—a win-
dow, a low wall, a tree, a ravine—has become a military object through its 
use. Because adversaries do not realize that the object used as cover con-
ceals a soldier, they have no reason to protect themselves against attack. 
If it is inherently perfidious to disguise a military object as a civilian ob-
ject, any offensive use of cover would qualify as an act of perfidy. Yet sol-
diers have not only always used cover for offensive purposes during com-
bat, the invention of projectile weapons—such as magazine rifles, machine 
guns and artillery—has made cover a practical necessity in modern con-
flict.44  
It is not surprising, then, that States have consistently affirmed the le-
gality of using cover for offensive purposes. The UK military manual, for 
example, specifically deems “surprises” permissible ruses of war.45 Other 
military manuals agree, including those issued by Belgium, Canada, New 
Zealand and the United States.46 The only restriction on the use of cover 
involves the same civilian/civilian-object distinction discussed in the con-
text of camouflage and ambush: it is perfidious to “shoot behind the cover 
of a wounded man” or any other non-combatant.47 
Once again, however, the customary position is theoretically problem-
atic. After all, the effectiveness of cover depends on the fact that the adver-
sary sees only a civilian object and thus assumes that IHL both prohibits 
him from directly attacking the object and prohibits his attacker from using 
the object to attack him. So why doesn’t an attacker who deliberately takes 
advantage of that belief in order to kill the adversary commit an act of per-
fidy? 
                                                                                                                      
41. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY 342 (James C. Bradford 
ed., 2004). 
42. Id. 
43. Cover is obviously useful both for defense and offense. Headquarters, Depart-
ment of the Army, FM 21-75, Combat Skills of the Soldier 1-2 (1984). 
44. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY, supra note 41, at 342. 
45. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 5.17.2 (2004). “Surprise” is not the same as “ambush,” because the 
UK manual specifically distinguishes between the two. 
46. CUSTOMARY STUDY II, supra note 18, at 1246–55. That may not seem like a par-
ticularly significant number of States. I would suggest, however, that most States do not 
specifically mention the use of cover because it would never occur to them that it could be 
perfidious for a soldier to shoot at the enemy from behind a pile of rubble in the middle 
of a firefight. 
47. Fleck, supra note 31, at 284. 
 
 
 
Disguising a Military Object as a Civilian Object Vol. 91 
 
530 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The centrality of cover in modern conflict suggests that States simply 
do not believe that the sight of a civilian object entitles an enemy soldier to 
assume that it will not be used to attack him. That belief seems justified. As 
Fleck explains, the practice of modern warfare has long since rendered any 
such assumption of safety from attack obsolete: 
 
The traditional rule that hostilities must be confined to open combat . . . 
is still valid in principle, but is being increasingly eroded—if not com-
pletely thwarted—by the practice of employing sabotage squads and task 
forces in modern guerilla warfare. To combatants in modern armed con-
flicts, a complete lack of suspicion would be tantamount to impardonable 
recklessness. A soldier may claim protection on account of his good faith 
only in those exceptional cases where belligerent acts are prohibited in 
view of a special relationship between him and the adversary.48 
 
This argument, however, proves too little when an attacker uses cover 
to kill an enemy soldier. The attacker may not have invited the enemy sol-
dier to believe that he was protected against attack. But by disguising the 
fact that the civilian object was a military object (through use), the attacker 
did invite the enemy soldier to believe that Article 48 of AP I obligated him 
not to attack the object. And the attacker then deliberately used the enemy 
soldier’s acceptance of that invitation to kill the enemy soldier. The attack-
er’s use of cover thus satisfies all three elements of perfidy. 
As with camouflage, then, there is simply no satisfying theoretical ex-
planation for why the lethal use of cover should not be considered perfidi-
ous. That use qualifies as a ruse of war for one reason, and for one reason 
only: States have insisted that using cover for offensive purposes is a legit-
imate military practice. 
 
D. Booby-Traps 
 
Of all the military practices considered in this article, the use of a booby-
trap most directly involves disguising a military object as a civilian object. A 
booby-trap is a “device or material” that is “designed, constructed or 
adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person 
disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an ap-
                                                                                                                      
48. Id. at 278. 
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parently safe act.”49 Almost any object can be turned into a booby-trap, 
from personal items such as flashlights and framed photos to furniture, 
floorboards and doorways.50 Booby-traps can be used for both offensive 
(causing casualties) and defensive (slowing movement) purposes,51 and are 
most effective as antipersonnel devices.52 
None of the core texts of conventional IHL—the Hague Regulations, 
the Geneva Conventions, or the Additional Protocols—specifically prohib-
it the use of booby traps.53 Nor does the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the 
CCCW, which has 102 States parties; indeed, the Amended Protocol spe-
cifically permits State parties to use them, subject to certain limitations.54 
One important constraint concerns the nature of the booby-trap itself: they 
cannot be attached to or associated with “internationally recognized pro-
tective emblems, signs or signals” or objects such as “sick, wounded or 
dead persons,” children’s toys and other objects used for “the feeding, 
health, hygiene, clothing or education of children,” food and drink, and 
religious artifacts.55 A second important limitation concerns how otherwise-
lawful booby-traps can be used. If they are designated for a civilian-
occupied area “in which combat between ground forces is not taking place 
or does not appear to be imminent,” they must either “be placed on or in 
the close vicinity of a military objective” or measures must be taken “to 
protect civilians from their effects, for example, the posting of warning 
sentries, the issuing of warnings or the provision of fences.”56 
                                                                                                                      
49. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices (as Amended on 3 May 1996) art. 2(4), May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93 
[hereinafter Amended Protocol II]. 
50. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, WEAPONS THAT MAY 
CAUSE UNNECESSARY SUFFERING OR HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS 50 (1973) (men-
tioning examples) [hereinafter UNNECESSARY SUFFERING REPORT]. 
51. Chief of the Defence Staff (Canada), B-GL-320-010/FP-002, Mines and Booby-
Traps, Part 1, All Arms § 2-5-1 (1997). 
52. UNNECESSARY SUFFERING REPORT, supra note 50, at 50. 
53. See, e.g., AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 8, ¶ 1519. 
54. See Amended Protocol II, supra note 49, art. 3(2) (noting that States are responsi-
ble for the booby-traps they use). See also INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DE-
PARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, 
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 17 (2010) (noting that booby-traps “were [not] declared 
by the States Parties/drafters [of the CCCW] to cause unnecessary suffering or to be illegal 
as such. . . . [They] were regulated (and, in some cases, certain types prohibited) in order to 
provide increased protection for the civilian population”).  
55. Amended Protocol II, supra note 49, art. 7(1). 
56. Id., art. 7(3). 
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Customary IHL also permits States to use booby-traps in certain situa-
tions.57 As the ICRC has noted: 
 
Both treaty practice and other State practice support the premise that 
booby-traps are prohibited if, by their nature or employment, their use 
violates the legal protection accorded to a protected person or object by 
another customary rule of international humanitarian law. . . . The list of 
booby-traps prohibited by Protocol II and Amended Protocol II to the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons is found in the military 
manuals and legislation of some States party to these treaties. Other mili-
tary manuals are more general in their description and stress that booby-
traps associated with objects in normal civilian daily use are prohibited, 
and that booby-traps must not be used in association with protected per-
sons, protected objects (such as medical supplies, gravesites and cultural 
or religious property) or internationally recognised protective emblems or 
signs (such as the red cross and red crescent).58 
 
States whose military manuals consider the careful use of booby-traps to be 
lawful include Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Germany, Israel, Kenya, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Russia, Spain, Ukraine, the UK and the United States.59 
The lawfulness of using booby-traps in certain situations is inconsistent 
with the idea that it is inherently perfidious to disguise a military object as a 
civilian object. At most we can say that some specific booby-traps are perfidi-
ous—namely, those that violate Amended Protocol II. All others are per-
missible ruses of war. Indeed, the ICRC Commentary on AP I adopts pre-
cisely that distinction with regard to Article 37(2). In the view of its au-
thors, the CCCW, “which has taken up virtually all the proposals submitted 
during the Diplomatic Conference, provides for an interpretation of pro-
hibited ruses within the meaning of this paragraph, in the field of delayed-
action weapons.”60 
                                                                                                                      
57. See, e.g., SOLIS, supra note 25, at 424 (“With restrictions, the use of booby-traps 
was lawful in 1939, and their use remains lawful today.”). 
58. CUSTOMARY STUDY I, supra note 37, at 278–79. 
59. CUSTOMARY STUDY II, supra note 18, at 1246–55. 
60. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 8, ¶ 1519. Cf. Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual 
(“It is forbidden to use booby-traps wherever they can be expected directly to endanger 
the physical integrity and the lives of civilians. They must not be set up in a perfidious 
manner, that is be attached or connected in some way to protective signs or signals, pro-
tected persons, animals, food or protected installations.”), quoted in CUSTOMARY STUDY 
II, supra note 18, at 1815. 
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It is worth noting that the civilian/civilian-object distinction is also crit-
ical in the context of booby-traps. As Kelly points out, although using a 
booby-trap that simulates a civilian object can be a permissible ruse of war, 
it is inherently perfidious for an attacker to place a booby-trap while dis-
guised as a civilian: 
 
Another factor in partisan warfare that raises questions in regard to assas-
sination is the use of booby-traps, set for a particular person. For exam-
ple, the doorbell to a district military or political leader’s house may be 
wired to explosives, or his vehicle may be fixed to explode when he turns 
the ignition key. Using the traditional approach it would seem to follow 
that if the trap were set by a man in uniform it would not be an assassina-
tion, but that if set by a partisan it would be. This would be so regardless 
of the fact that the individual who did the killing is miles away when the 
bomb actually explodes.61 
 
The ICRC Commentary to AP I takes the same position.62 
 
E. Landmines 
 
A mine as “a munition placed under, on or near the ground or other sur-
face area and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or con-
tact of a person or vehicle.”63 Placing a landmine involves disguising a mili-
tary object as a civilian object. The military object, the landmine, is hidden 
beneath the civilian object, whether artificial (such as a road) or natural 
(such as a field), thereby creating the illusion that the mined area contains 
only civilian objects. Enemy soldiers are thus lulled into a false sense of 
security from attack—a sense that is dispelled only when one of them steps 
onto the landmine and is killed. 
As with booby-traps, conventional IHL carefully regulates but does not 
categorically prohibit the use of landmines. Two conventions are particular-
ly important. The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stock-
piling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their De-
                                                                                                                      
61. Joseph B. Kelly, Assassination in Wartime, 30 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 101, 106–7 
(1965).  
62. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 8, ¶ 1713 (noting, with regard to “booby-traps 
which are . . . used by regular forces,” that “it is only by wearing a distinguishing sign 
when placing these devices in position, that these combatants can be distinguished from 
the civilian population”). 
63. Amended Protocol II, supra note 49, art. 2(1). 
 
 
 
Disguising a Military Object as a Civilian Object Vol. 91 
 
534 
 
 
 
 
 
 
struction (Ottawa Convention),64 which has 162 States parties, prohibits 
States from using landmines against military personnel; they can only use 
them to target military vehicles.65 States that have not ratified the Ottawa 
Convention, but which have ratified the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the 
CCCW, are entitled to use landmines against both personnel and vehicles,66 
but they must design them to be detectable67 and to avoid causing super-
fluous injury or unnecessary suffering,68 must avoid directing them at the 
civilian population,69 must avoid placing them indiscriminately70 and must 
take all feasible precautions to prevent them from harming civilians.71 
Customary IHL also permits States to use landmines, as long as they 
take “particular care . . . to minimise their indiscriminate effects.”72 Indeed, 
according to the ICRC, customary IHL does not even prohibit States from 
using landmines against military personnel, because “[a]bout a dozen non-
party States have used anti-personnel mines in recent conflicts” and “sev-
eral States, including China, Finland, India, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia 
and the United States, have not ratified the Ottawa Convention and main-
tain that they are still entitled to use anti-personnel landmines.”73 
The lawfulness of using landmines in a certain way, like the lawfulness 
of using booby-traps, further undermines the idea that it is inherently per-
fidious to disguise a military object as a civilian object. Some uses of 
landmines are likely perfidious, namely, those that violate Amended Proto-
col II. All other uses, however, must be considered permissible ruses of 
war.74 
 
                                                                                                                      
64. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 17, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211. 
65. Id., art. 1(a). 
66. Amended Protocol II, supra note 49, art. 3(2) (noting that States are responsible 
for the mines they use). See also OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at 17. 
67. Amended Protocol II, supra note 49, art. 4. 
68. Id., art. 3(3). 
69. Id., art. 3(7). 
70. Id., art. 3(8). 
71. Id., art. 3(10). 
72. CUSTOMARY STUDY I, supra note 37, at 280 (Rule 81). See also CUSTOMARY STUDY 
II, supra note 18, at 1828–29 (noting that the military manuals issued by Canada, Israel, 
Russia and Spain do not absolutely prohibit use of landmines). 
73. CUSTOMARY STUDY I, supra note 37, at 282. 
74. See AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 8, ¶ 1519. 
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IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE GENERAL RULE 
 
As the previous section indicates, there is no support in either conventional 
or customary IHL for the idea that it is inherently perfidious to kill by dis-
guising a military object as a civilian object. On the contrary, conventional 
and (particularly) customary IHL deem five military practices that involve 
such disguise permissible ruses of war, at least in some situations: camou-
flage, ambush, cover, booby-traps and landmines. 
That does not mean, of course, that it is never perfidious to disguise a 
military object as a civilian object. One requirement for such disguise to 
qualify as a ruse of war is particularly obvious, given that Article 37(1)(c) 
specifically considers “the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status” an 
act of perfidy. Thus, the attacker who kills by using a military object dis-
guised as a civilian object must still respect the principle of distinction with 
regard to the civilian population. That requirement takes two forms. For 
practices like camouflage, ambush and cover, the principle of distinction 
requires the attacker to ensure that he avoids using camouflage to simulate 
civilian status. In other words, although it is a permissible ruse of war to 
make a tank look like a building, to set up an ambush behind a hedgerow 
or to take cover behind a burned-out school bus, it is a prohibited act of 
perfidy to blend into a civilian population by wearing civilian clothes, to set 
up an ambush in a crowded school or to take cover behind a combatant 
who is hors de combat. For practices like booby-traps and landmines, by con-
trast, the principle of distinction requires the attacker to wear a uniform or 
other fixed and distinctive sign while placing the delayed-action weapon. 
Moreover, even if an attacker complies with the principle of distinction 
with regard to persons, his right to disguise a military object as a civilian 
object is not unlimited. On the contrary, two other important restrictions 
apply: (1) a military object must never be disguised as a civilian object that 
receives special protection under IHL; and (2) outside of a zone of active 
or imminent combat, booby-traps and similar objects—objects that require 
physical placement—must be located in the close vicinity of a legitimate 
military objective. 
  
A. Specially-Protected Objects 
 
It is inherently perfidious to kill by making a military object—a thing, a ve-
hicle, a building, etc.—appear to be a civilian object that receives special 
protection under IHL. According to the ICRC, such objects include ob-
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jects displaying the Red Cross or Red Crescent; objects using United Na-
tions emblems and signs; objects using other protected emblems, such as 
those identifying cultural property, civil defense, works containing danger-
ous forces, hospital and safety zones, and POW camps; and objects using 
the emblems of neutral States.75 Similarly, the CCCW specially protects 
dead bodies, gravesites, medical facilities, children’s toys and care equip-
ment, food and drink, kitchen utensils, animals, and harmless portable ob-
jects.76 In terms of the practices discussed in this article, therefore, acts of 
perfidy would include camouflaging a tank to blend into a church; setting 
up an ambush inside a hospital; taking cover behind a Red Cross ambu-
lance; booby-trapping a stuffed animal; or employing landmines in a demili-
tarized zone. 
 
B. Combat Zones  
 
It is also possible to argue that outside of a zone of active or imminent 
combat, the lethal use of booby-traps is a permissible ruse of war only if 
the booby-traps are placed in the close vicinity of a legitimate military ob-
jective. As noted above, the use of booby-traps is significantly restricted “in 
any city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of 
civilians in which combat between ground forces is not taking place or 
does not appear to be imminent.” In such situations, it is not enough for a 
booby-trap to comply with Article 7(1) of the CCCW’s Amended Protocol 
II. It must also either “be placed on or in the close vicinity of a military ob-
jective” or “measures [must be] taken to protect civilians from their effects, 
for example, [by] the posting of warning sentries, the issuing of warnings or 
the provision of fences.”77 The second option is obviously useless for an 
attacker who wants to use booby-traps for offensive purposes. In practice, 
then, that attacker will have to place the booby-trap in the vicinity of a le-
gitimate military objective instead. 
To be sure, Amended Protocol II is silent concerning whether violating 
the Protocol should be considered an act of perfidy. The ICRC Commentary 
to AP I, however, suggests that, in fact, it is perfidious to violate any of 
Amended Protocol II’s restrictions on the use of booby-traps. With regard 
to what is now Article 7(1), for example, the Commentary explicitly states 
that “[t]o associate booby-traps at any category of persons or objects pro-
                                                                                                                      
75. See CUSTOMARY STUDY I, supra note 37, at 224. 
76. Amended Protocol II, supra note 49, art. 7. 
77. Id., art. 7(3). 
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tected by the Protocol would be to infringe [Article 37(1) of AP I], by invit-
ing the adversary’s confidence as regards the protection provided for in the 
Protocol, with the intention of killing or wounding him.”78 But the Commen-
tary does not limit its discussion of perfidy to Article 7(1); it also says that, 
“moreover,” because the drafters of the CCCW took up “virtually all the 
proposals submitted during the Diplomatic Conference” that led to AP I, 
Amended Protocol II “provides for an interpretation of prohibited ruses 
within the meaning of this paragraph, in the field of delayed-action weap-
ons”79—a much more categorical statement that would seem to apply to 
violations of Article 7(3), as well. 
 This interpretation of the relationship between Amended Protocol II 
and perfidy, it is worth noting, makes conceptual sense. In a zone of active 
or at least imminent combat, no soldier can reasonably assume that the en-
emy will place its booby-traps only in the “close vicinity” of military objec-
tives; after all, as noted earlier, it is legitimate to use booby-traps for offen-
sive purposes. Outside of such zones, by contrast, the situation is very dif-
ferent: the drafters of Amended Protocol II could easily have believed that 
soldiers, though not insulated from attack, were at least entitled to assume 
that the enemy would not place booby-traps in purely civilian areas. After 
all, doing so would dramatically increase the likelihood of innocent civilians 
being killed.80 
Is the “close vicinity” requirement a practically important limitation on 
the lethal use of military objects disguised as civilian objects? In a tradition-
                                                                                                                      
78. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 8, ¶ 1519 
79. Id. 
80. This argument raises an important question: wouldn’t the same considerations 
apply to any military practice that involves disguising a military object as a civilian object? 
If soldiers outside an active or imminent combat zone are entitled to assume that booby-
traps will not be placed in purely civilian areas, aren’t they equally entitled to make the 
same assumption concerning, for example, ambushes? Must they always assume they can 
be ambushed anywhere at any time, even when they are not in a zone of active or immi-
nent combat and are not near a military objective? Two responses are possible. First, be-
cause they are human directed, ambushes are far less likely to result in civilian casualties 
than booby-traps—and that is true even when the ambushes are launched from purely 
civilian areas outside a zone of active or imminent combat. Second, theory aside, States 
have simply not limited the use of ambush in the same way as they have limited the use of 
booby-traps. There is no ambush Protocol. So as much as we might be troubled by 
“peacetime” ambushes in purely civilian areas, it is difficult to conclude that States consid-
er them (or the offensive use of camouflage) perfidious. As Watts has noted, when it 
comes to perfidy, “an approach that abandons or ignores States’ deliberate legislative work 
does not offer the law or its beneficiaries any real favors.” Watts, supra note 8, at 168. 
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al territory-based conflict, probably not: there will likely be a number of 
military objectives outside of active and imminent combat zones that can 
be booby-trapped, especially given that land constitutes a military objective 
insofar as its “total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization in the 
circumstances governing at the time offers a definite military advantage.”81 
The situation might be quite different, though, in modern asymmetric con-
flicts between States and transnational terrorist groups. In many such con-
flicts, the terrorists will have little desire to control territory—and when 
they do desire to control it, that territory will often qualify as a zone of ac-
tive or imminent combat. An attacker may thus have few military objec-
tives outside of combat zones that can be effectively booby-trapped. 
Mughniyah’s killing is a case in point: it is difficult to see how the civilian 
SUV had become a military objective through its “nature, location, purpose 
or use.” To the contrary, the SUV was used simply because it provided a 
convenient location for a remotely-detonated explosive device. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Sean Watts has noted that despite more than a century of effort, “a coher-
ent account of law-of-war perfidy remains elusive.”82 Whether it is perfidi-
ous to kill an adversary by disguising a military object as a civilian object is 
a case in point. The text of Article 37(1) of AP I suggests that such killings 
are in fact perfidious, because they all take advantage of a well-trained ad-
versary’s reluctance to deliberately attack a civilian object. But Article 37(2) 
specifically deems camouflage—a common way to make a military object 
appear to be a civilian object—a permissible ruse of war, not a prohibited 
act of perfidy. Moreover, it is clear that, as a matter of customary interna-
tional law, at least four other forms of civilian disguise are permissible ruses 
of war: ambush, cover, booby-traps and landmines. As a result, with the 
exception of civilian objects that are specially protected under IHL, it is 
impossible to argue that either conventional or customary IHL categorical-
ly prohibits using a military object disguised as a civilian object to kill. 
All that said, it does indeed appear that Mossad committed perfidy by 
using a remotely-detonated explosive to kill Mughniyah. As discussed 
above, customary IHL likely deems violations of the CCCW’s Amended 
                                                                                                                      
81. CUSTOMARY STUDY II, supra note 18, at 32. An example is an area “through 
which an adversary is likely to move its forces.” Id. at 224–25 (citing the AUSTRALIAN DE-
FENCE FORCE MANUAL, supra note 38, at 5-5). 
82. Watts, supra note 8, at 161. 
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Protocol II to be perfidious. The Mossad operation violated Amended Pro-
tocol II: Article 7(3) applies to remotely-detonated explosive devices as well 
as to booby-traps;83 Mughniyah was killed in a Damascus suburb far away 
from any zone of active or imminent combat involving Hezbollah; and the 
explosive device was placed inside a civilian SUV, not in the “close vicini-
ty” of a military objective. Mughniyah’s killing, therefore, was perfidious. 
 
                                                                                                                      
83. Article 7 of Amended Protocol II applies to “other devices,” as well as to booby-
traps, and Article 2(5) defines “other devices” as “manually-emplaced munitions and de-
vices including improvised explosive devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which 
are actuated manually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time.” 
